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Abstract Along with the improvement of electrical
equipment reliability, people’s unsafe behaviors and
human errors have become one of main sources of risks in
power systems. However, there is no comprehensive study
on human factors and human reliability analysis in power
systems. In allusion to this situation, this paper attempts to
analyze the impact of human factors on power system
reliability. First, this paper introduces current situation of
human factors in power systems and the latest research
progress in this field. Several analysis methods are
proposed according to specified situations, and these
methods are verified by some power system practical cases.
On this base, this paper illustrates how human factors affect
power system operation reliability from 2 typical aspects:
imperfect maintenance caused by human errors, and impact
of human factors on emergency dispatch operation and
power system cascading failure. Finally, based on infor-
mation decision and action in crew (IDAC), a novel dis-
patcher training evaluation simulation system (DTESS) is
established, which can incorporate all influencing factors.
Once fully developed, DTESS can be used to simulate
dispatchers’ response when encountering an initial event,
and improve power system dispatching reliability.
Keywords Human factors modeling, Human reliability
analysis, Power system reliability, Imperfect maintenance,
Emergency dispatch operation, Dispatcher training
evaluation simulation system (DTESS)
1 Introduction
Electrical energy is the basic resources of national
economy and people’s life. Power systems play a key role
in power generation and transmission. In the past few
decades, power systems have enormously expanded in
scale and become more complex in structure. As a result,
reliability is becoming an important issue. With the
development of smart grid, electrical equipment reliability
and automation technology have been improved on large
scale. However, power systems cannot operate without
human by far, and people’s unsafe behaviors and human
errors can have a great impact on power systems [1]. To
further improve power system reliability, it is necessary
take human factors into consideration.
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Through analyzing major incidents of power systems in
last decades, it can be seen that human factors made sig-
nificant contributions to these failures [2]. Human errors
are identified as one of the main causes of the blackout in
North American in August 2003 [3] and the Italian
blackout in September 2003 [4]. Human errors could occur
in any situations involving people, such as power system
operation, electrical equipment maintenance and power
system dispatching [5]. Although we gradually realize the
importance of human factors in power systems, there are
few researches in this area.
For better analysis of human factors’ impact on power
system reliability, we should figure out human error
mechanism and recognize how human errors occur. Proper
analysis methods are necessary, especially for quantitative
assessment. Furthermore we need to demonstrate the
influence of human factors on power system from several
main aspects. After this, we could obtain some measures to
improve human operational reliability.
In this paper we make a comprehensive introduction of
human errors and some common accidents resulting from
human factors. According to specific operation scenarios,
we establish several models of human factors, and propose
corresponding methods for human reliability analysis
(HRA). These methods are verified by some power system
practical cases. On this basis, we establish a modified
maintenance model considering imperfect maintenance
caused by human errors. Furthermore, the influence of
human factors on dispatching operation and power system
cascading failure are analyzed through IEEE 24-bus test
system. Finally, a novel Dispatcher Training Evaluation
Simulation System based on information decision and
action in crew (IDAC) is established, which can consider
all the influencing factors. Once fully developed, it can be
used for dispatcher dynamic assessment in order to find out
operators’ shortcomings and improve power system dis-
patching reliability.
2 Human errors and human factors in power
systems
Human errors can be defined as any human actions, both
cognitive and physical, that potentially or actually result in
negative effects on system’s normal functions [6]. As
power systems become more complex, human operators
are supposed to work in various situations, and they may
encounter all kinds of emergencies. If human behaviors
exceed an acceptable limit, it could lead to a disaster.
The final report on August 14, 2003 blackout in the
United States and Canada shows dispatchers’ lack of
monitoring of grid state is an important cause leading to
cascading failure [3]. In the 5.25 Moscow blackout,
dispatchers failed to take measures after a large number of
tripping, which caused the accident to expand [7]. On May
7, 2004, Golmud power grid split from main grid due to
substation personnel’s fault action on protection device. On
April 1, 2005, operation personal’s misoperation resulted in
power outage of 220 kV Lingyuan substation.
Some of these accidents are attributed to human errors,
however we seldom try to investigate the cause of human
errors. Human error is not a cause, but a consequence,
which is shaped and provoked by the upstream factors [8].
Operators’ actions in power systems can be affected by
various factors, like external environment, complexity of
operation task, operators’ knowledge and experience, and
so on. We consider all these factors that may cause human
errors as human factors. In some researches, performance
influencing factors (PIFs) and performance shaping factors
(PSFs) [9] are used to describe human factors. PIFs and
PSFs are usually classified according to various standards
and purposes. Reference [10] proposed a data-informed
PIF hierarchy for human reliability analysis, which consists
of five categories: organization related, time related, person
related, situation related and machine related factors.
Through investigation we can see that human operation
could be affected by many factors in power systems, such
as task complexity, operation period, experience, physical
state and so on. In different situations, the dominating
factors that have the greatest influence on human reliability
may be different. Therefore, it is important to determine
the exact PIFs according to actual situations.
3 Human factors modeling and HRA methods
in power systems
It is widely recognized that human errors could not be
avoided completely. However, we can take measures to
reduce human error probability. Human reliability is the
opposite concept of human error. As an essential part of
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), HRA has been
widely researched in many fields which have higher
requirement on reliability, as in nuclear power plant and
aerospace [11]. Qualitative and quantitative HRA could be
used in system design, operation and optimization in order
to improve human reliability. Nevertheless, in the aspect of
power systems, there are very few studies about HRA.
With the development of HRA, many methodologies are
established to analyze human errors, such technique for
human error rate prediction (THERP) [12], cognitive reli-
ability and error analysis method (CREAM) [13], human
error assessment and reduction technique (HEART) [14], a
technique for human error analysis (ATHEANA) [15].
Moreover in some references, human reliability is assessed
using a Markov model with a constant transition rate for
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human error [16, 17]. In order to recognize personals’
cognitive process when dealing with system failures, sev-
eral dynamic HRA methods are proposed, and IDAC is a
typical dynamic HRA method [18]. Reference [19] iden-
tified requirements for human reliability model to be
integrated into system dynamic probabilistic risk analysis.
Reference [20] described the existing dynamic HRA sim-
ulations, and gave a prospect about next work to increase
the fidelity of simulated accident scenarios. Lack of
appropriate and sufficient performance data has been
identified as a key factor affecting HRA quality, especially
in the estimation of human error probability. Therefore,
U.S. Nuclear Regulation Commission (NRC) tried to
develop a HRA database (SACADA) to satisfy this data
need [21].
We should notice that most of these methods originated
in other industries, and they not specified for power sys-
tems. So it is necessary to propose several HRA methods
suitable for power system specific situations. As we know,
the primary cause of human errors differs a lot in different
operation scenes. Thus, it is significant to make proper
classification of power system operation scenarios for
human reliability analysis. According to the investigation,
power system operation scenarios are classified into 3
categories: time-centered scenarios, process-centered sce-
narios and emergency-centered scenarios. Then three HRA
methods suitable for the above three scenarios are proposed
respectively.
3.1 Time-centered HRA (TCHRA)
Time-centered scenario refers to situations where oper-
ators should continue to work for a long time without
interruptions, such as system state monitoring and new
equipment debugging. Operators will become fatigue and
the probability of human error to occur will increase
accordingly. Statistics show that many accidents are caused
by people’s fatigue [22]. It is obvious that continuous
working time (CWT) is the primary factor that affects
human reliability in this scenario. Besides, some other
human factors may also influence this process, such as task
complexity, environment factors, human knowledge and
experience.
Proportional hazard model (PHM) [23] could be used
for quantitative analysis of time-centered scenario. PHM
has been wildly used in the field of engineering, biology
and mechanics. The hazard function in PHM consists of
two parts: baseline function and link function. The hazard
function can be expressed as
hðt;ZÞ ¼ h0ðtÞwðZÞ; t 0 ð1Þ
where h0(t) is the baseline function which could be used to
indicate the change of human reliability with CWT; wðZÞ is
the link function, which could be used to indicate the
influence of covariates, Z, on human reliability. In
TCHRA, five main covariates are considered: task
complexity z1, environment factors z2, human knowledge
and experience z3, human psychology z4 and physical state
z5. Therefore, it could be defined as
Z ¼ z1; z2; z3; z4; z5½  ð2Þ
wðZÞ ¼ expðcZÞ ð3Þ
We suppose the influence coefficient of each covariate
could be 0, 1 or 2. When influence coefficient is lager, this
factor has more effect on human reliability, and human
errors are more likely to occur. c is the weight value of
each covariate. Since available data is limited, we cannot
obtain the weight value through fitting process by far. In
this paper, the weight value of covariate is obtained via
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [24]. Through expert
assessment, the five covariates are compared in pairs with
respect to their relative importance to human error
probability. Then their value weight could be calculated.
Assuming the operation begins at time t = 0, then
human reliability function could be expressed as






where Rhp(t) is the probability that human error has not
occurred before the moment t. According to [25], Weibull
distribution function could be adopted as baseline function,





The parameters can be estimated through careful
statistical analysis. According to [25], b = 3, a = 200
hours.
In order to illustrate the relation between human relia-
bility and continuous working hours, we suppose there are
three irrelevant scenes. Through expert assessment, the
influence coefficient and weight value in different scenes
are obtained, shown in Table 1.
Then human reliability function could be expressed as
Table 1 Influence coefficient and weight value in each scene
Covariate Influence coefficient c
Scene 1 Scene 2 Scene 3
z1 1 1 1 0.27
z2 0 1 2 0.18
z3 0 1 2 0.22
z4 1 1 2 0.15
z5 0 1 2 0.18
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The probability of human error could be expressed as
FhpðtÞ ¼ 1  RhpðtÞ ð7Þ
With the increase of CWT, human error probability
changes as shown in Fig. 1.
In Fig.1, when CWT is less than 10 hours, the human
error probability is extremely low (less than 7 9 10-4).
When CWT increases, human error probability increases
accordingly. Although the staffs work less than 10 hours a
day under normal conditions, long-time lasting work still
exists, such as annual inspection of main transformer while
the whole substation is out of power, and new equipment
debugging before operation. Through investigation, we find
that human errors are more likely to happen in these
situations.
Thus, in order to ensure operational reliability, we
should limit continuous work within reasonable time.
Besides, we could take some measures to improve human
reliability, such as improving operator’s skill and experi-
ence by training, improving operator’s mental and physical
state, and making work condition more suitable.
3.2 Process-centered HRA (PCHRA)
Process-centered scenario refers to situations where
operation task consists of many steps, and operators should
follow certain procedures to finish the work. We should
pay attention to the process to avoid human errors. Modi-
fied CREAM could be used to analyze this kind of sce-
nario. CREAM [13], proposed by Hollnagel E, hold the
idea that cognitive functions contain several generic failure
types. CREAM concluded the basic probability value of
each generic failure type, which is called cognitive failure
probability (CFP). The nominal values of cognitive func-
tion failures are shown in Table 2.
In CREAM, all human factors are divided into 9 cate-
gories, called common performance conditions (CPC). The
expected influence of CPCs on human reliability could be
generalized as three levels: reduced, not significant and
improved, shown in Table 3.
The CREAM standard method divided the control
model into four classes, Strategic, Tactical, Opportunistic
and Scrambled. Each control model has a corresponding
error probability interval [13]. Although CREAM method
has been widely accepted and used in many fields, some
aspects require improvement. Since the CPCs are not
specially introduced for power systems, we should con-
cretize CPCs according to regulations and actual conditions
in power systems [26]. For example, working conditions
could be divided into sub-CPCs: personal security
requirement, equipment security requirement and envi-
ronment requirement.
We could assess each sub-CPCs firstly, then we can
obtain the score of CPCs with analytic hierarchy process.
The score of CPC varies from 0 to 100 according to the
concrete conditions except Time of day, which varies from
0 to 24. Since human reliability analysis is still at the
starting stage in power systems, and related data statistics
is still very scarce. The use of expert systems, such as fuzzy
expert systems, can be helpful to improve the assessments
with limited data available [27]. In this paper, triangular
fuzzy model is used to lower subjectivity of judgment
[28].
The process of quantifying human error in process-
centered scenario is shown is Fig. 2.
In PCHRA, we should first determine the cognitive
function and operation scenario according to concrete
operation task. Then we could calculate the basic value of
human error probability (HEP) after analyzing the generic
failure types. For example, when executing one action, we
find the generic failure types are: action of wrong time
(E2), action out of sequence (E4) and missed action (E5),















Fig. 1 Human error probability in TR-HRA
Table 2 Nominal values for cognitive function failures
Cognitive function Generic failure type Basic value
Observation O1. Wrong object observed 0.001
O2. Wrong identification 0.007
O3. Observation not made 0.007
Interpretation I1. Faulty diagnosis 0.02
I2. Decision error 0.01
I3. Delayed interpretation 0.01
Planning P1. Priority error 0.01
P2. Inadequate plan 0.01
Execution E1. Action of wrong type 0.003
E2. Action of wrong time 0.003
E3. Action of wrong object 0.0005
E4. Action out of sequence 0.003
E5. Missed action 0.003
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then basic HEP value of executing this action could be
calculated using the following equation.
PE ¼ 1  ð1  PE2Þð1  PE4Þð1  PE5Þ ð8Þ
After obtaining basic value of HEP, we should analyze
the level of CPCs and obtain correction coefficient using




PHEP ¼ PHEP0  100:25b ð10Þ
where PHEP0 is the total basic HEP value of the whole
operation task; PHEP is the final value of HEP; b is the HEP
correction coefficient; qi is the influence coefficient of
CPCi.
We take Xuyue station as an example for analysis [29].
The main transformer turning to operation from cold
standby needs ten steps, and the operation in Step 2 is
shown in Table 4. The cognitive function and generic
failure types in Step 2 is shown in Table 5. With (8) we
Table 3 Common performance conditions in CREAM
CPC Expected effect Influence coefficient Fuzzy set
Adequacy of organization Reduced -1.2 (0, 0, 45)
Not significant 0.0 (30, 50, 80)
Improved 0.8 (70, 100, 100)
Working conditions Reduced -1.0 (0, 0, 45)
Not significant 0.0 (25, 50, 75)
Improved 0.8 (70, 100, 100)
Adequacy of operational support (MMI) Reduced -1.2 (0, 0, 40)
Not significant 0.0 (30, 50, 80)
Improved 1.2 (75, 100, 100)
Availability of procedures Reduced -1.3 (0, 0,30)
Not significant 0.0 (20, 50, 80)
Improved 1.4 (70, 100, 100)
Number of simultaneous goals Reduced -1.2 (0, 0, 45)
Not significant 0.0 (35, 50, 80)
Improved 0.4 (70, 100, 100)
Available time Reduced -1.4 (0, 0, 30)
Not significant 0.0 (20, 50, 70)
Improved 1.2 (60, 100, 100)
Time of day Reduced -0.8 (0, 4, 8)
Not significant 0.0 (7, 12, 17)
Improved 0.8 (16, 20, 24)
Adequacy of training and experience Reduced -1.4 (0, 0, 35)
Not significant 0.0 (25, 50, 70)
Improved 1 (60, 100, 100)
Crew collaboration quality Reduced -1.5 (0, 0, 40)
Not significant 0.0 (30, 50, 70)
Improved 1.2 (60, 100, 100)
Analyze the level of CPCs
Calculate basic value of HEP
Obtain correction coefficient
Obtain the final value of HEP








Fig. 2 Process of quantifying human error
Table 4 Step 2 of operation ticket to run spare transformer
No. Operation contents
1 Check the state of CB #313, make sure it is OFF
2 Close disconnector 313-1 and check it
3 Check the switch voltage
4 Close disconnector 313-4 and check it
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could calculate the basic value of HEP in Step 2 is 0.011,
and the HEP of the whole process is 0.0753.
We suppose the operation is conducted in 3 different
contexts, and Context 3 represents the worst situation. In
Context 3, the organization is inadequate, and there is lack
of sound management system; the working conditions is
unpleasant; there is not enough operational support; there
exists some deficiencies in arrangement; the work is
complex and time load is heavy for the current operators;
what’s more, the task is conducted at 4 a.m. Context 1
represents the best-case of these three contexts, and Con-
text 2 is somewhere between Context 1 and Context 3.
According to CREAM basic method, we could figure out
that Contexts 1, 2, 3 belong to Tactical, Opportunistic and
Scrambled control model, respectively.
Through scenario analysis, we could obtain the scores of
CPCs in different contexts. Then we could calculate the
membership of each level with triangular fuzzy model.
With (9) and (10), we could obtain correction coefficient
and the final value of HEP, shown in Table 6.
From the simulation we can see, on the one hand, the
results of these three contexts locate in the reliability
interval of appropriate control model. It proves the validity
of the proposed methods. On the other hand, we can con-
clude that Context 1 is more suitable for human operation
when comparing with Context 2 and Context 3. It
demonstrates the impact of CPCs on human operation
quantitatively. We could also calculate the change of
human reliability when CPC differs. Furthermore, we could
take directed measures according to the simulation results.
For example, if time of day (4 a.m. in Context 3) is a main
influencing factor, we could adjust to finish the work in the
day if possible in order to improve human reliability.
3.3 Emergency-centered HRA (ECHRA)
Emergency-centered scenario refers to situations where
power system failures occurred and operators need to react
in a short time, including diagnose fault and take proper
measures. In this scenario, human reliability has significant
effect on clearing faults and recovering system reliability.
Human cognitive reliability (HCR) [30] method could be
used to quantify HEP in emergency-centered scenarios.
According to different ways of response, human
behavior is usually divided into 3 categories. This classi-
fication is commonly known as skill-based, rule-based and
knowledge-based (SRK) framework [31]. Skill-based
behavior is assumed to be highly integrated patterns of
behavior. Since the operator is so familiar with the situa-
tions, human behavior takes place without conscious
attention. Rule-based behavior refers to executing routine
tasks according to regulations strictly. This type of
behavior is typically controlled by a stored procedure.
During unfamiliar situations, no procedures are available,
and human behavior is considered as knowledge-based.
The operator has to rely upon their knowledge to make
decisions and deal with the operation task.
It is not hard to find that human errors are more likely to
occur in knowledge-based situations and less likely to
occur in skill-based situations. According to survey results
[30], it is recognized that once the operation task, scenario
and operators are determined, human error probability is
only related to the ratio of operation allowable time (t) and
operation execution time (T1/2). The relationship could be
expressed with Weibull distribution function with 3
parameters, which is shown in (11).




where P(t) is the probability of human error; a, b, c are
dimension, shape and location parameters, and their values
are determined by operation category [32], shown in
Table 7; t is the operation allowable time which is deter-
mined by power system characteristic; T1/2 is the operation
execution time which could be obtained by (12).
T1=2 ¼ T1=2;nð1 þ K1Þð1 þ K2Þð1 þ K3Þ ð12Þ
where T1/2,n is the average execution time in regular situ-
ation, which could be obtained according to the statistics;
Table 5 Human error analysis of operation Step 2
No. Cognitive function Failure types Basic value
1 Observation Wrong object observed 0.0010
2 Execution Action of wrong object 0.0005
Action out of sequence 0.0030
Observation Wrong object observed 0.0010
3 Observation Wrong object observed 0.0010
4 Execution Action of wrong object 0.0005
Action out of sequence 0.0030
Observation Wrong object observed 0.0010
Table 6 Scores of CPC in three different contexts
Contexts CPC1 CPC2 CPC3 CPC4 CPC5
1 80 80 90 88 90
2 70 60 60 60 65
3 30 30 30 30 30
Contexts CPC6 CPC7 CPC8 CPC9 PHEP
1 90 12 90 85 0.0052
2 70 23 65 70 0.0573
3 30 4 30 30 0.3792
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K1, K2, K3 are the adjustment coefficients to execution time
from aspects of training, operator mental state and opera-
tion support.
For example, when line protection channel fault occurs,
main protection should quit operation manually. This
process is supposed to be finished within 8 minutes.
Through investigation we find that the average time to
finish the job is about 5 minutes, and it depends on oper-
ators. Operator A has experience in dealing with such sit-
uations, while Operator B is inexperienced, and should
follow the regulations to finish the job. The parameters
could be defined as Table 8.
From Table 8, we can see that Operator A might fail to
finish the operation with a probability of 0.005, while the
probability is 0.341 for Operator B. Through analysis we
can conclude that when facing with emergency situations,
experience, operation time and psychological state will
affect human operation a lot. High quality is an essential
way to enhance human reliability in emergency conditions.
4 Impact of human factors on maintenance
Electrical equipment maintenance is significant to
maintain power systems stable, prolong the service life of
equipment and reduce the system power loss. According to
statistics of grid accidents, maintenance personal mistakes
occupy a large proportion [33]. In this part, we first
establish a periodic maintenance (PM) model considering
imperfect maintenance caused by human factors, and
demonstrate the impact of human factors on maintenance
availability with a simple case.
4.1 Electrical equipment maintenance model
considering imperfect maintenance
In most cases, analysts assume that maintenance is
totally perfect, which is unrealistic. Effect of maintenance
could be weakened by human factors, and more than that,
the system occasionally becomes even worse due to human
errors [34]. Several common human errors and their
external forms in maintenance are listed below.
1) Latent failures which are not detected during mainte-
nance due to operators’ insufficient awareness.
2) Wrong adjustments, incorrect estimations of system
states and inappropriate decisions.
3) Replacement with fault parts and damages introduced
during maintenance, which could be attributed to
human action errors.
The results of maintenance will be quite different due to
different levels of human reliability, as shown in Fig. 3
[35]. According to maintenance quality, the results can
differ from perfect maintenance to maintenance failure.
Since we aim to demonstrate the impact of human errors on
equipment maintenance in this paper, we make two
assumptions:  other factors are completely reliable except
human factors; ` results of maintenance consist of three
categories considering human factors.
Category 1: perfect maintenance, denoted as PM, namely
the system becomes as good as new after maintenance.
Category 2: as bad as old, denoted as ABAO, namely the
system state does not change after maintenance.
Category 3: failure after maintenance, denoted as FAM,
namely maintenance failure occurs, and the system needs
repair after maintenance.
When human errors occur, the maintenance is consid-
ered as imperfect. The probability of human error (hep)
could be obtained with PCHRA method proposed in Sec-
tion 3. The percentage of human error cause maintenance
failure is defined as n. The probability of PM, ABAO and
FAM could be expressed as follow.
PFAM ¼ hep  n ð13Þ
PABAO ¼ hep  ð1  nÞ ð14Þ
PPM ¼ 1  PABAO  PFAM ð15Þ
It is assumed that system begins as new and the age is
set as t = 0. The maintenance period is DT and every
maintenance time is Dt. If the system fails during
Table 7 Values of a, b, c in different operation categories
Operation category a b c
Skill-based 0.407 1.2 0.7
Rule-based 0.601 0.9 0.6
Knowledge-based 0.791 0.8 0.5
Table 8 Parameters values for different operators
Operator a b c K1 K2 K3 HEP
A 0.407 1.2 0.7 -0.12 0 -0.22 0.005
B 0.601 0.9 0.6 0.28 0.28 -0.22 0.341
















Fig. 3 Results of maintenance considering human errors
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operation, it will be repaired with mean time l2. If the
system fails after maintenance, mean repair time will be l1.
Under normal circumstances, l1 is smaller than l2, since a
failure during operation is an emergency, and the repair is
not prepared in advance. If system state does change after
maintenance, it will continue operating. If the maintenance
is perfect, or the system is repaired after failure, the system
is renewed and system age returns to 0. Equipment periodic
maintenance model is shown in Fig. 4.




















where R(t) is the reliability function; F(t) is the cumulative
distribution function of system failure; Ppm, Paf, Pmf are the
probability that system is renewed by perfect maintenance,
repair after actual failure and repair after maintenance















The availability of system could be expressed as (20)
when maintenance time is neglected.
Through a simple case, we will analyze the impact of
human errors on maintenance availability.
4.2 Results of case study
The proposed methodology is illustrated using a system
of 3 units [36] and the reliability function of this system is
RðtÞ ¼ 3e2t  2e3t ð21Þ
In this case, we assume hep increases from 0.05 to 0.9, n
is 0.7, and the ratio of l1/l2 is 0.5. With the variation of the
maintenance period, maintenance availability changes as
shown in Fig. 5. DT* is normalized by 104 hours. For
example, if DT* = 0.02, then DT = 0.02 9 104 = 200
hours.
It can be seen that when hep increases from 0.05 to 0.9,
the maintenance availability decreases if DT* is less than 1,
which is the mean time to failure (MTTF) of the system.
When hep is smaller than 0.5, there exists optimal main-
tenance period that maximizes the availability. While hep
is larger than 0.5, maintenance will not be able to improve
the system availability any more due to the negative effect
of human errors.
From the results of case study, we can see that human
errors affect maintenance availability a lot, and we should
Fig. 4 Equipment periodic maintenance model
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take human factors into consideration when determining
the optimal maintenance period.
5 Impact of human factors on dispatching
operation
Reasonable dispatching is a key part in maintaining power
systems reliable and secure. However, dispatching operation
faces risks due to uncertainties, such as adverse weather,
equipment state and human errors. Common human errors in
power system mainly include three categories.
1) Insufficient of situation awareness, referring to the
situation where dispatchers fail to have a comprehen-
sive acquisition of system information in time, or
dispatchers fail to have a correct understanding of
system state.
2) Dispatch decision errors, dispatchers might make
wrong dispatch decisions due to insufficient experi-
ence or pressing time.
3) Dispatch action errors, which mainly refer to physical
action mistakes occur during operation, including action
of wrong type, action of wrong object or missed action.
Through analysis of latest grid accidents, we can con-
clude human errors have a great influence on power system
reliability, especially in emergency situations. Human error
probability in emergency situation could be calculated with
ECHRA method proposed in Section 3. Since the allow-
able time is short, dispatchers might make mistakes under
great pressure. In this part, we will analyze the impact of
human errors on emergency dispatch and the development
of power system cascading failures.
5.1 Impact of human factors on cascading failures
Cascading failure is one of main reasons that lead to
power system blackout. Under normal conditions, trans-
mission lines operate with a certain initial power load.
However, a single outage may result in line thermal
overload. If the overload could not be removed within
permitted time, more components will be tripped one by
one, which increasing the probability of cascading outage
and blackout. Allowable time to relieve line’s overload is
shown in Table 9 [37].
In Table 9, PCON, PLTE and PSTE are the continuous,
long-time and short-time emergency ratings. We define the
third condition as critical overload, because the overload
lines should be tripped immediately. In the initial stage of a
cascading failure, also called pre-cascading stage, dis-
patchers have enough time to take measures and prevent
failures extending. If dispatchers fail to restore power
system to normal state at this stage, it will enter fast-cas-
cading stage, which can result in cascading outage and load
disconnection.
In this part, we only consider the critical overload. Due
to human errors, dispatchers may fail to finish the work at
pre-cascading stage. We will evaluate the impact of human
errors on dispatch operation in emergency condition.
During the evaluation, shown in Fig. 6, we conduct
‘‘N - 1’’ test of the system, and all lines are tripped one by
one as the initial event. A DC power flow is used for this
analysis, and the critical overload line will be tripped.
Dispatch operation will be correctly executed with a
probability of human reliability.
5.2 Case study of IEEE RTS 79 system
In this part, IEEE RTS 79 system [38] is used for
analysis. We suppose generator #10 and #18 are out of
service for maintenance, and line capacity is adjusted. If
Line 4 is tripped because of failure and operators failed to
take any measures, system state will develop as follow.
Table 9 Allowable working time at different load levels




Fig. 6 Impact analysis of human errors on dispatch operation
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From Table 10, we can see Line 28 will be overload
after the outage of Line 4. Then Line 28 will be tripped
beyond the allowable time, as a result Lines 24, 25, 26 will
be overload. In the next stage, Lines 24-26, 30-33 and 38
will be tripped by automation device. By far Buses 17, 18,
21 and 22 are isolated. With the development of system
stage, outage extends constantly. In Stage 5, more than half
of buses are isolated and the system is split.
During the process of failure extending, if operators take
proper measures, like generation re-dispatching, it is pos-
sible to avoid system splitting. Amount of load shedding is
different if the system is stabilized at different stage.
From Table 11, we can see if the system is stabilized at
Stage 1 or 2, there will be no load shedding. The loss of
load will increase to 657 MW and 1401 MW if emergency
dispatching operation is successful at Stages 3 and 4
respectively. If all operations failed, the system will lose
the whole load.
Emergency dispatch operation may fail with a certain
probability p in every stage. When the system is stabilized
after one successful operation, amount of loss load (PLOSS)
could be expressed as
PLOSS ¼ ð1  pÞPLOSSð1Þ þ pð1  pÞPLOSSð2Þ
þ p2ð1  pÞPLOSSð3Þ þ p3ð1  pÞPLOSSð4Þ
ð22Þ
where PLOSS(1), PLOSS(2), PLOSS(3), PLOSS(4) are the loss
loads at each stage. It should be noticed that, we only
consider the first 4 stages, because the system will probably
split if we cannot make it in the first 4 stages.
We suppose there are 3 scenarios, and the human
operation error probability p could be calculated with
proposed ECHRA method. Results of p are shown in
Table 12. Line transmission capacity is set as 75% of the
rated capacity. After the evaluation shown in Fig. 6, we get
the following results.
From Table 12, we can see loss load is minimal in
Scenario 1, while maximal in Scenario 3. In Scenario 1,
human operation reliability is the highest, and operators
could take emergency dispatching to stabilize the system
early; while in Scenario 3, human error probability is the
largest, failures could spread due to human factors. As a
result, more loads will be shed when system is stable.
It should be noticed that, in this section we aim to
analyze the impact of human errors on emergency dispatch
and the development of power system cascading failures.
To simplify the discussion, we neglect the dependency
among operators. Further research will be conducted to
establish a comprehensive analysis model for dispatching
operation, which focuses on the whole crew instead of
single operator.
6 Dispatcher training evaluation simulation
system
From analysis in Section 5, we can conclude that human
factors make a great impact on dispatch operation and
power system reliability. So we should apply human error
theory and human reliability analysis to practical. In this
part, we will propose a framework of dispatcher training
evaluation simulation system (DTESS), which could be
used as a tool for dispatcher training simulation. Different
from conventional dispatcher training simulator (DTS)
[39], DTESS is completely based on simulation and oper-
ators’ cognition process is modeled with IDAC method.
Once fully developed, it can simulate dispatchers’ response
to various conditions in detail. The framework of DTESS is
shown in Fig. 7.
As shown in Fig. 7, DTESS consists of 4 modules: main
program module, operator module, scheduler module and
power system simulator module.
1) Operator module Operator module aims to model
dispatcher’ response to system in different situations.
Based on the IDAC, this model mainly consists of three
parts: I-D-A cognition model [40], performance influenc-
ing factors [41] and rules of behavior [42]. The operators’
Table 11 Loss of load in different stage






Table 12 Loss of load in different operation scenarios




Table 10 Development of system state
Stage Overload line Outage line Isolation bus
1 4
2 28 28
3 24–26 24–26, 30–33, 38 17, 18, 21, 22
4 2, 6, 10, 14, 15, 17,
18, 20
2, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15,
17, 18, 20, 27
3, 15, 24
5 5, 12, 13, 16, 19,
23, 29, 34–37
9, 11–13, 16, 19,
21–23, 29
4, 6–9, 11–14,
16, 19, 20, 23
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state is initialized at the very beginning. During the
evaluation, some static PIFs will stay unchanged over a
period of time, while dynamic PIFs should be assessed
over every time step. According to the rules of behaviors,
this module will generate operator actions.
Dispatchers are supposed to take various trainings and
tests, such as skill training, security testing, psychological
test and qualifications grading. All these results could be
taken into consideration to make the modeling of
dispatcher more precise.
2) Scheduler module DTESS uses dynamic event tree
(DET) [43] to represent scenario development follow-
ing an initiating event. This module controls the
evolution of event sequences, and the branches are
generated when system state changes or operators take
actions at every time point. Some termination criteria
should be determined before the simulation, for exam-
ple branch probability is less than a specific value and
power system splits into disconnected parts. A sequence
will be terminated when the termination criteria is met.
Another function of this module is to save information
at each point, like states of power system, dispatchers’
action and branch probability. We could obtain details
of dispatchers’ operation by retrieving this information.
3) Dispatcher simulator training module This module
includes most parts of conventional DTS. It simulates
static or dynamic process of power systems, including
the behaviors of relay and automatic equipment.
Another function of control center model is to provide
interaction between power system and dispatcher. On
one hand, it reveals power system present state to
dispatcher model through data acquisition, data
processing, event and alarm processing, remote adjust-
ment and control, man-machine interface, etc. On the
other hand, actions form dispatchers are implemented
with this model.
4) Main program module Main program module is the
controlling part of the framework, managing the calls to
other modules. The general flow of DTESS is shown in
Fig. 8. At the beginning of the evaluation, state of
power system and levels of PIFs are initialized.
According to dispatcher model and power system
model, scheduler model decides whether DET branches
are generated. If there is more than one branch, the
scheduler model will save the branch information and
proceed with simulating the first branch until it meet the
termination criteria. Then the end state information is
stored and next branch information is loaded to
continue the simulation. When all the sequences are
simulated, the simulation will be terminated.
Compared to DTS, DTESS has many advantages. First,
DTESS could record dispatchers’ actions, both cognitive
and physical, in response to an initial event in detail.
Furthermore, since all the probabilities are stored, so we
can assess a dispatcher more objectively and accurately.
Through analysis of simulation results, we can find out
operators’ shortcomings and improve dispatch reliability.
Besides, DTESS could also be used to assess the quality of
Fig. 7 Framework of DTESS
Fig. 8 Flow chart of simulation process in DTESS
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other trainings, like security training and skill training
through adjusting operator module.
7 Conclusion
Human factors have great impact on power systems
reliability; however, there are few researches in this field.
In allusion to this situation, we attempt to analyze the
impact of human factors on power system reliability
comprehensively. Main contributions of this paper include
the following aspects.
1) Through analyzing human errors and operation sce-
narios in power systems, we established human factor
models and proposed 3 human reliability analysis
methods. Since these methods are based on practical
characteristics of power system operation scenarios,
they are suitable for power systems, and they are
verified by some power system practical cases.
2) We analyzed the impact of human factors on main-
tenance. Electrical equipment maintenance could not
be always perfect due to human errors, and mainte-
nance availability can be affected a lot. So it is
necessary to take human factors into consideration
when determining maintenance policy.
3) We analyze the impact of human errors on emergency
dispatch. Analysis and evaluation results demonstrate
that it could avoid cascading failures and reduce power
loss by improving human operation reliability.
4) Based on IDAC, we propose a framework of dis-
patcher training evaluation simulation system, which
could be used as a tool for dispatcher training
simulation. It could take all the influencing factors
into account, and make a comprehensive assessment of
dispatchers. With DTESS we can find out operators‘
shortcomings and improve dispatch reliability
As a noteworthy issue, human reliability analysis in
power systems deserves more attention. We should take
further researches into how to quantify human error prob-
ability, the influence of human factors on power system,
and the measures taken to reduce human errors and
enhance power system reliability.
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